INTRODUCTION
'Gentlemen, we have run out of money; now we have to think.'
--Sir Winston Churchill
It is now more imperative than ever for the Air Force to develop a new services business model. Under the current model, NAF activities have lost millions of dollars in recent years, and if current financial loss activity is an indicator of future performance, then NAF activities will continue to lose millions of dollars on an annual basis in the years ahead. In addition, today's millennial generation is perhaps the most "unique" generation in decades because they have grown up in the information and technology age. Understanding this generation is important because Air Force millennial generation Airmen comprise 69 percent of today's Air Force, 2 so they significantly contribute to the economic prosperity of any Air Force installation services program. Coupling the need to upgrade an outdated services business model with the necessity to meet the needs and desires of today's Airmen is reason enough to make changes; however, there is perhaps a more driving reason for developing a new model -funding constraints.
Fiscally challenging times demand the Air Force find every single dollar it can to ensure the survival of Air Force readiness and modernization.
The Air Force has been negatively impacted with fiscal challenges since 2011, and as it projects budget shortfalls over the next decade, the Air Force must consider all saving options.
Although Airmen readiness and modernization have come to the forefront during these difficult financial times, Airmen quality of life is a competing factor that the Air Force must consider.
The Air Force maintains its most valuable weapon system is its people, and it places a lot of emphasis on quality of life. However, fiscal demands have forced Air Force leadership to make some difficult choices that will have some now unforeseeable second and third order effects for years to come. Airmen understand these fiscally constrained times call for sacrifices and that quality of life will be impacted in the name of readiness and modernization; however, 
THESIS
The existing services business model does not meet the needs of today's millennial generation or a fiscally-constrained Air Force, so the Air Force should divest itself of NAF programs that lose money and convince AAFES to establish national and local community business partnerships that meet the needs and desires of Airmen and their families.
Part I Why change the FSS CONUS NAF activity business model?
There is a need to change the CONUS NAF activity business model (from henceforth all references to NAF activities in this paper will imply CONUS only locations since overseas NAF According to the data, Category C activities suffer the most losses. The implication is the business model used to operate those activities has become irrelevant to customers. If an installation's Category C activities operate at a loss, then gains generated by Category B and other Category C activities must compensate for those losses from the base's overall MWR fund at the expense of base Airmen and their families. Every dollar required to support a losing NAF activity could have been used to provide other desired MWR activities. So the end result is over $4.6M per year is spent to support non-value activities instead of activities to increase resilience and morale. This financial practice has been happening for decades without major reform.
For the purposes of this paper and based on the data, the focus for a business model change should be on "non-core" Category B and C activities as identified by Services
Transformation. The "non-core" financially-failing Category B activities include: bowling centers (less than 13 lanes); arts and crafts centers; automotive skill development centers; and information, ticketing, and tours services. The "non-core" financially failing Category C These "non-core" Category B and Category C programs were identified as vulnerable for closure under Services Transformation; however, base commanders, may have been reluctant to close activities without programs to replace failing activities. They may have been concerned about a decrease in morale and in the base communities they were leading. Below at figure 2 is a table listing of major Category B and Category C or "non-core" programs under Services
Transformation. 8 In the table, the activities from ITT to Aero Club are "non-core" programs, and they are the NAF activities suffering most of the financial losses. Services Transformation successfully identified the problem, but the Air Force has not developed a business model solution.
( Figure 2) The implication is that Airmen and their families vote by spending or not spending dollars at these activities. Therefore, considering this trend of losses by activity over several years, evidence supports that the Air Force needs a new business model because it can no longer afford to sustain a $4.65M loss on a rolling 12-month basis. Again, this amount only accounts for "non-core" Category C activity losses. It does not include the "non-core" Category B activity losses or the millions of dollars in personnel and building infrastructure costs to operate those failing activities. These losses and costs are rationale driving the need for a new model. 
The Millennial Generation
There has been much debate about how to define the millennial generation. Millennials were born between 1980 and 1995. 9 Some of their many characteristics indicate they enjoy multi-tasking and are extremely savvy with electronics. Even though it is well known that millennials are technologically savvy, the Air Force has not upgraded its NAF activities or programs that promote electronics or technology as a theme of recreation. Therefore, the Air Force needs to recognize purchasing habits and preferences of millennials from a marketing perspective in order to develop a relevant services model. Based on research conducted by the millennial focused Barkley marketing group, "Millennials align to brands with a purpose." 10 In other words, millennials prefer national brands, and this is important because base NAF activities are not associated with national brands; they are independent, no-name operations.
Millennial shopping habits indicate that youthful and future patrons want more on-line and interactive programs. In a recent world-wide survey conducted by the company, eMarketer, 40 percent of male millennial respondents indicated they would buy everything online if they could. 11 The chart below lists more millennial characteristics.
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( Figure 3 )
Sequestration Impacts
Sequestration mandated that the Department of Defense decrease costs by $470 billion over a 10 year period. 13 It has forced funding reductions and provided additional justification to develop a new NAF activity business model. The benefit of sequestration drives efficiencies.
However, the Services, Manpower, and Personnel career field has unsuccessfully attempted to adjust its failing NAF business model by continuing to implement Services Transformation.
Failures of Services Transformation
Services Transformation was an attempt to solve the services business model dilemma;
however, there was no comprehensive Air Staff approach to creating a new model. For example, NAF transformation focused on the accounting system while food transformation only focused on campus feeding and included both dining hall and NAF food activities. There was also an effort to identify services activities as core, enhanced or noncore. In an August 2013 Armed Forces Press Service article entitled, "Air Force offers potential model for future MWR programs," 14 it provided several examples of successful attempts to upgrade services to better meet the demands of today's millennial generation; however, it failed to identify a strategic approach. This is the current dilemma.
Although Services Transformation does not solve the dilemma, the Air Force has identified the need for a business model upgrade due to decades of declining appropriated fund support in dollars and manpower. 15 The Air Force has been contemplating a new business model for some time. However, the problem has been developing one that fits the Air Force mission.
There are several constraints that must be taken into consideration. One constraint is that the majority of people who work on base do not live on base. Another constraint is NAF businesses cannot compete with off-base competition when it comes to marketing and programming. An additional constraint is the inability of "outsiders" to access and use the services. A final constraint is that there are several important factors that inhibit base NAF activities from operating like "real" businesses such as outdated regulations and business concepts.
These factors combined have ensured NAF services offered to Airmen have remained unsuccessful for decades. With these difficult issues in mind, it is time for the Air Force to develop a new model.
Part II How should the Air Force define 21st Century services business model?
The The PPV model recommends installations partner with national and local businesses to operate on the installation. Partnerships could also be formed off the installation; however, the Air Force must take caution and not neglect operations on base. Otherwise, base communities will deteriorate which will defeat the force support squadrons' mission to build a sense of community. One of the many benefits of the PPV model is government investment costs are very low. While there are times when the host organization may "chip in" a small amount of funds, those funds are typically provided for the purpose of boosting or creating the infrastructure necessary to accommodate the installation with a desired concept or brand. The bulk of the funding (usually 75 percent or more) is provided by the brand operator, franchisee or parent organization. Their funding provides for the brand specific build out in the space, décor, equipment, signage, et cetera, and all other items necessary to operate in spaces. 16 The agreements are typically written for three five-year periods, and the awardee or licensee will pay a percentage of monthly sales as concession income. Therefore, the Air Force would have low investment costs and a monthly income as benefits to hosting these agreements, and base customers would get to enjoy the best of today's commercial sector food service and retail providers.
This PPV concept has been proven, and it is currently in existence and successfully operating at some Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard installations. This model also exists at the Pentagon. NEXCOM leads the Pentagon food operation and the Department of Defense Concessions Committee (DoDCC) leads the Pentagon's retail operation. NEXCOM's food operation increased by fifteen million dollars in FY13 for a 148 percent sales increase compared to FY01 when the PPV began. DoDCC's retail operation increased by eight million dollars in FY13 for a 64 percent sales increase compared to FY01 when the PPV began. 17 Ironically, AAFES has recently initiated this PPV concept at their Army led Fort Bliss, Texas base. Initial feedback indicates that it has been successful. However, there is one major limitation to establishing PPV: the size of the base population must be large enough for businesses to take interest. The implication is that this concept may only provide an option for Air Force led joint bases and other bases that have extremely large populations. The Air Force could discuss this stipulation with AAFES and decide which bases meet the population requirements to establish PPV. At least, this is one option that provides an alternative to the current model, which is broken.
The other community business partner option is a Third-Party Lease Agreement (TPLA).
A TLPA resembles a lease that a tenant would sign with any National Mall Owner. AAFES is currently exploring this type of community business partnership to save expenses. By treating their real estate or vacant space in a similar fashion as a commercial landlord would outside the gate, AAFES maximizes its potential use of space. Under this concept, AAFES would work with commercial real estate brokers to negotiate what they have historically operated themselves.
By outsourcing restaurants/retail facilities, the licensee would be responsible for the furniture, fixtures, and equipment; the overhead for operating expenses, personnel, and cost of goods sold.
AAFES would take a fee from the licensee, and the Air Force would need to negotiate its fee with AAFES to feed its MWR fund. The monetary-exchange details can be negotiated, but the strategic concept is the important starting point if the Air Force desires to eliminate failing "noncore" NAF activities.
TPLA provide more flexibility than PPV because the size of the base population is not the "sole" factor for businesses to form an agreement. Businesses factor marketing demographics into TPLA, and although the base population number would be a factor, there would be additional factors such as base patron age groups and gender statistics. While PPV would be contingent upon larger base populations, TPLA could provide small to medium bases more national and local business options. This concept would require AAFES to engage national and local community businesses to determine what they need to warrant establishing their business operations on an installation. TPLA could provide an additional option for the Air
Force to replace failing NAF activities.
Once the Air Force decides to pursue PPV for large base populations, pursue TPLA for all of its CONUS bases, or pursue a combination of both PPV and TPLA depending on the base size, then the Air Force can set a timeline to begin closing failed "non-core" NAF activities.
This decision to close NAF activities will promote additional savings for the Air Force by reducing the size of the force support squadron. It will take courage for senior Air Force leadership to close failing "non-core" NAF activities just as much as it will take courage for AAFES to form community business partnerships. Implementing this approach will require leadership, risk taking, innovation, and resolve since there will be roadblocks. Edits can be provided for outdated instructions and legislation can be updated, if necessary. Air Force (services) leadership must determine how to use this strategic approach to get to "yes" instead of responding with every possible reason why this vision cannot be accomplished. Maintaining the status quo will ensure senior Air Force leaders agonize over readiness, modernization, and unfortunately, a missed opportunity to improve Airmen quality of life and morale for decades to come. The time to implement this new business model is now.
